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abstract With reference to the experience of the Cuban Revolution, this article
addresses what may be called the ‘late revolutionary paradox’: How can so many
people in countries such as Cuba continue to pledge visceral allegiance to their revolu-
tion while at the same time expressing deep disaffection with it? My main claim is that
the paradox is a product of an undue analytical emphasis on the ideological content of
revolutionary discourse, with its mantra-like evocations of ‘process’, ‘change’, ‘eman-
cipation’ and other discursive projections into the future. Seen from the point of view of
its form as a socio-political event, I argue, revolution turns on a deeper premise, namely
the commitment to self-sacrifice, i.e. the assumption that revolutionary subjects are
defined by their potential death in defence of the revolution. The premise of self-sacri-
fice, I argue, lends revolutionary politics a peculiar ontological foundation that makes it
radically different to, broadly, ‘liberal’ understandings of politics. This difference, I
show, dissolves the putative ‘paradox’ of later revolutionary societies such as Cuba,
allowing revolutionary subjects to sustain a sense of revolutionary conviction in the
face of the many historical contingencies that would seem otherwise to make such
enduring convictions increasingly difficult to sustain.
keywords Revolution, Cuba, sacrifice, political ontology, state
One of the things that strikes even casual visitors to Cuba since theopening of the island to Western tourism is the startling ease withwhich local people, particularly in Havana and other parts accus-
tomed to the ﬂow of foreigners since the 1990s, voice their many dissatisfactions
with the now so obviously ailing state of their socialist Revolution. Complaining
about – indeed lamenting – sundry indices of what even the state media some-
times call the ‘moral crisis’ of recent years is so common among Cuban citizens
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that it has come to acquire the character of a kind of social lubricant, akin to
British people’s habitual exchanges about the weather (see also Holbraad
2011). The phrase ‘no es facil’ (it is not easy), which can follow any manner of
complaint – from state sanctioned electricity interruptions due to lack of
petrol, to interminable programmes of staged political debate on state television,
to the rise of delinquency, alcoholism, prostitution and so on – functions almost
as a sign of punctuation: a sentence’s temporary pause in resigned desperation.
‘Life’, people say in summary – which is to say life in Cuba’s apparently ‘late’
period of revolutionary socialism – ‘is a struggle’. La vida es una lucha. No es
facil . . . (see also Holgado Ferna´ndez 2000; Gordy 2006; Pertierra 2011).
Quickly accustomed to my own friends’ daily litanies of this kind in the ﬁrst
months of my PhD ﬁeldwork in 1998, a time in which the Cuban Revolution’s
future prospects seemed no less uncertain than they do today, I tended rather
quickly to take these as signs of people’s basic exhaustion with their govern-
ment’s relentless pursuit of a socialist path since the revolution of 1959.
Indeed, since these complaints were often couched as unfavourable compari-
sons with the time ‘before’ (antes) the monumental crisis brought about by
the demise of Cuba’s economic and military guarantors in the Soviet bloc,
which initiated the period Fidel in 1991 pronounced as ‘Special’ (el periodo
especial) and which has never since been ofﬁcially declared as having ended,
my instinct was to interpret my friends’ expressions of desperation as an
index of the near-collapse of Cuba’s enduring, and now so solitary, experiment
with socialism. Certainly, Western commentators on Cuban society (CNN,
BBC, assorted bloggers, etc.) as well as dissident voices speaking to their
foreign publics from the island typically offer just such interpretations:
Cubans, oppressed for more than ﬁve decades in the name of socialism, are
fed up, and, since they cannot say so on pain of punishment by the authorities,
they grumble quietly to each other and to any foreigner who may care to listen.
During the course of my ﬁeldwork and in the years since, however, I have
come to have serious doubts about this manner of understanding the situation
in Cuba. A ﬁrst inkling that something might be amiss with the liberal demo-
cratic fantasy of Cuba ﬁnally in popular ferment against an exhausted totalitar-
ian ‘regime’ came to me one night when, rather unguardedly due to the effects
of the rum we were drinking, and a little fed up myself with my closest friends’
constant litanies of complaint, I let my own libertarian colours show by
suggesting that, if they were so dissatisﬁed with their situation, they should
perhaps do something about changing their government. ‘That’s what we did
in 1973 in Greece’ (where I come from), I said in risque´ tone. Instantly sobering
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the atmosphere, and cooling it considerably, my good friend Manolo1 (a state-
trained playwright in his late 40s) cut my banter off: ‘This is not Miami and we
are not worms!’ (gusanos, the term used popularly and in earlier times ofﬁcially
to refer to the revolution’s defectors in the USA and elsewhere). ‘This is our
country and if we have to ﬁght for it and for all this shit that you see around
you, we will!’
It has to be said that at the time I took my friend’s seemingly knee-jerk and
rather macho reprimand as a natural reaction to a foreigner’s presumptions.
From a Greek perspective, I am very used to my own chauvinistic responses
when it comes to sundry Northern Europeans lecturing me on all of my coun-
try’s failings – the ‘how dare you!’ retort. But other poignant episodes that took
place as my ﬁeldwork continued showed me that such an interpretation too is
inadequate on its own. As I began to realise, my working assumption that
people’s complaints with the current state of their version of revolutionary
socialism must imply a nascent anti-revolutionary impulse was misplaced,
and my interlocutors’ dissatisfaction came rather from the left, so to speak. If
anything, it was often because people were committed to their Revolution that
they were so expressly dejected with its ailing state in the Special Period.
Indeed, what I found was that Manolo’s immediate recourse to the language
of violence and self-sacriﬁcial heroism in defence of the Revolution was entirely
characteristics of such episodes – so much so that, as I shall argue in this article,2
their role deserves to be considered as somehow integral to people’s political
stance, my question being how. Before setting up the problem, however, let
me ﬁrst show what this heady and intriguingly peculiar mix of late socialist
dejection and apparently visceral and chauvinistic revolutionary fervour looks
like with reference to two further examples.
The ﬁrst concerns a conversation I had somemonths later with another close
friend, Hortencia, a middle-aged housewife from one of the poorer neighbour-
hoods of Havana. The conversation was about her longstanding search for a
better ﬂat, which had for years been hampered by the great complexities of
moving house in Cuba, due not only to the ailing state of housing stock in
recent decades, but above all to the legal prohibition on house sales which
means that in order to move home one needs effectively to ﬁnd someone
willing to swap (the system is much more complicated in practice, but I will
not enter into the details here). Exasperated with having in the meantime to
live with her estranged partner and his parents (a very common predicament
in Cuba’s arthritic housing situation at the time), Hortencia was recounting
the details of her latest failure to secure alternative living quarters. In this
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connection, and in ethnographic mood, I asked her whether an added uncer-
tainty weighing on the process was the lack of clarity in ownership deeds,
since so many of the properties people occupy were originally owned by
those who left the island at various stages after the revolution – the ‘worms’
of my earlier example. ‘I have no idea,’ Hortencia replied, shrugging me off.
‘But let them try! [i.e. to claim their properties back in some future date].’
‘Don’t you know that each and every Cuban is ready to defend themselves?
There are plans for these things, there’s the armed forces, but we also are all
armed. Every house has a weapon, and people are ready!’
If Hortencia’s tale of weapons and universal preparedness seemed a little
extreme to me at the time, its poignancy was driven home on a separate
visit to Havana some years later, in 2004 – my second ethnographic illus-
tration. This took place in the home of another good friend, Rogelio, a
music-school-trained brass player who these days earned dollars by teaching
foreigners to play Cuban percussion. Gathered in his front room for an infor-
mal drinking party with friends, we were chatting about music when another
friend of mine, Jose Luis, whom Rogelio had met through me a few times
before, arrived quite drunk and in a vile mood. Quite imposing in character,
Jose Luis was a Leningrad-trained academic with a keen interest in current
affairs. Soon, as was his want when he was drinking, he started to dominate
the conversation, on this occasion with a string of comments, in turns bitter
and indignant, about all manner of controversies regarding current govern-
ment policies. Noting that our host Rogelio was getting quietly agitated by
this, I tried to steer the conversation onto other topics, but to no avail. At
some point Jose Luis indicated the large photographs of Camilo Cienfuegos,
Che´ Guevara and Fidel himself that Rogelio, like so many other Cubans, kept
in prominent positions on his walls. ‘Look at these shameless sons of bitches!
(descarados hijos de puta) Ok, these two may have been different (pointing at
the photos of Camilo and Che´), they’re gone. But this guy (Fidel)! What a
piece of work he is!’ What I had failed to notice at this point is that
Rogelio had in the meantime disappeared into his bedroom. As we were
all reeling at Jose Luis’s outrageous remarks, Rogelio came storming back
into the living-room wielding a huge rusty machete, shouting in total parox-
ysm: ‘Get the fuck out! In this house we are revolutionaries, fuuuuuuck!!!!’
(¡¡¡en esta casa somos revolucionarios, con˜ooooo!!!) and lurched at Jose Luis who
beat a quick retreat out onto the street, shouting that the incident would
not end there, which, as a matter of fact, it did (the two men never spoke
again as far as I know).
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The aim of this article is to account for the fact that, while so often expressing
deep discontent and frustration with their current circumstances, so many of the
Cuban people I know (though admittedly far from all) continue to support
the Revolution, profess their pride for it, and wish to defend it. How is it that
the Cuban Revolution can continue to compel the commitment of so many
of its citizens notwithstanding – indeed alongside – severe anomie, disillusion-
ment, mass migration, an abiding sense of moral crisis, and the all-round
depressed character life in Cuba has acquired in this ‘special’ post-Soviet era?
Similar questions have frequently been asked in the literature on late socialist
societies in general, and a number of anthropologists have sought to address
them ethnographically (Humphrey 1983; Verdery 1996; Kligman 1998; Khar-
khordin 1999; Montoya 2007; for Cuba see Rosendahl 1997; Brotherton 2008;
Blum 2011). My argument here is offered partly as a response to a tendency in
some of this literature to account for the apparently self-contradictory political
stances of late socialist subjects by positing what Yurchak has called metaphors
of ‘binary socialism’ (2003, 2006: 6–8). In his landmark historical and ethno-
graphic study of what he calls the ‘late socialist’ period of the Soviet Union,3
Yurchak takes to task analyses that seek to account for these kinds of contradic-
tions by appeal to binary categories such as ‘oppression and resistance, repres-
sion and freedom, the state and the people [. . .], public self and private self, truth
and lie, reality and dissimulation, morality and corruption, and so on’ (2006: 5).
Ethnographically, Yurchak suggests,
what tends to get lost in the binary accounts is the crucial and seemingly paradoxical
fact that, for a great number of Soviet citizens, many of the fundamental values, ideals
and realities of Soviet life [. . .] were of genuine importance, despite the fact that many
of their everyday practices routinely transgressed, reinterpreted, or refused certain
norms and rules represented in the ofﬁcial ideology of the socialist state. (2006: 8)
And such an ethnographic distortion, he suggests, is owed also to an analytical
prejudice, to the extent that ‘binary’ accounts of socialist life rely on a series of
familiar assumptions about the nature of political subjectivity and agency.
Typical also of ‘dissident’ discourses within the Soviet Union from the 1970s
onwards, these tend to depict the subjects of ‘socialist regimes’ – and the
language is telling – as unitary individuals whose putative ‘split’ under socialism
is experienced as a loss of authenticity, subjectivity and agency, expressed in an
inability to effect change, due to the subjugation of state structures that restrain
the citizenry, forcing their acts of resistance into a realm of private truth, and so
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on (Yurchak 2003, 483–4). Precisely the kind of image I also took for granted in
my ﬁrst exposures to daily life and politics in Cuba.
My argument against such binary conceptualisations in what follows accords
with Yurchak’s critique both ethnographically and theoretically. I too want to
show that the visceral character of people’s commitment to the revolution
and its values deserves to be taken seriously, and that this requires a move
away from a series of inappropriate assumptions about what might count as a
person in this context. However, my attempt to solve the puzzle of the late revo-
lutionary paradox, if we may call it that, will be different from Yurchak’s.
Drawing on the Austinian distinction between constative and performative
meaning (Austin 1999), Yurchak’s core argument is that late Soviet subjects
could continue to subscribe to the socialist project because, after Stalin, doing
so became principally a matter of performing a series of discursive forms
(ways of talking, writing, participating in state structures, etc.) whose constative
meaning became more or less opaque and insigniﬁcant. Paradoxically, this
allowed Soviet citizens to engage in all sorts of activities whose constative
meaning might often be rather far from socialist ideals, but whose performance
nevertheless conformed to socialist form. By contrast, my attempt to resolve the
apparent contradiction of Cubans’ simultaneous fervour and depression seeks to
widen the gap between the two rather than close it. Borrowing a term from
Viveiros de Castro’s (2004) analysis of the constitutive role of ontological diver-
gences in social life, I suggest that the apparently self-contradictory stance of
Cubans represents, not a binary opposition, but rather a binary ‘equivocation’.
Cuban people can so viscerally pledge allegiance to their Revolution while
also being so fed up with it because the object in either case is different: ‘revolu-
tion’, qua object of allegiance and morbidly depressed discontent respectively, is
two different things.
This kind of ontological ﬁrewall, I suggest, turns most crucially on the very
form of revolutionary action, and particularly its core demand for self-sacriﬁce –
the call to heroic preparedness for violence which, as we saw, is the most star-
tling ethnographic corollary of Cuban citizens’ enactment of their revolutionary
fervour: ¡Revolucio´n o Muerte! This demand for self-sacriﬁce is a catalyst for an
act of political cosmogony, if you like, which effectively rescinds the premises
upon which political discontent might rely. The chief characteristic of the pol-
itical universe that the command of self-sacriﬁce sustains, as I shall show, is its
all-encompassing totality – revolution as a world with ‘no outside’, as Guevara
himself once put it. Hence, accounts of the ‘paradoxes’ of the Cuban revolution
which posit a split between reality and propaganda, whereby ‘reality’ is
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conceived as somehow ‘beyond’ the ‘appearances’ that state ideology sets up
(hence denying its claims to ‘totality’), are in direct contradiction with the
content of that ideology – i.e. dismiss it as a matter of analytical pre-disposition.
This kind of distortion is an example of a deeper problem when it comes to
the analysis of revolutionary politics, which I venture to call the problem of
‘meta-liberalism’ or ‘analytical liberalism’. In asking ‘how can people continue
to be revolutionaries in the face of the revolution’s many failings?’, as I did
initially and as commentators on contemporary Cuban politics continue to
do, one is basically treating revolution as an ideology that is equivalent to its
alternatives (e.g. democracy, oligarchy or whatever) and imagining that
people are in some sense free to choose it or not. At stake here, in other
words, is the fundamental ontological premise of liberalism, that people have
an existence beyond the political forms to which they are subject and their
task must be at some level to choose between them – a notion that goes
back at least to John Locke’s image of peoples choosing their sovereign
(Locke 2003). The case of revolutionary politics in Cuba, I want to argue,
offers an analytical corrective to this approach inasmuch as it fundamentally
recasts the relationship between state and people on which ‘meta-liberalism’
rests (see also Zˇizˇek 1999; Humphrey 2007).
It may be noted that this also implies a methodological corrective of sorts. In
particular, it puts into question anthropologists’ reﬂex assumption that the best
way to account for people’s political commitments is to explore ethnographi-
cally how they come to acquire them in particular circumstances. What is it
about Cuban history, society, economy (and so on) that makes Cubans adopt
or reject the revolution and its ideals, asks the ethnographer, and then proceeds
to conduct what can be thought of as a micro-sociology of the social life of pol-
itical forms – their social reproduction, negotiation and contestation by ﬂesh-
and-blood people in the socio-historical contingencies that they inhabit. It is
remarkable, however, how much this ethnographic reﬂex owes to the core
liberal dispositif of people that remain transcendent to the political forms that
they may ‘acquire’: political life as an Exchange in which ideas, dispositions
and practices are adopted, held, contested, resisted or even traded for something
else, the job of the ethnographer being to show how this works out on the
ground.4 So, to the extent revolutionary politics qualiﬁes just this image, it
must also hold in check the ethnographic impulse, at least insofar as it conforms
to this meta-liberal image. Indeed, the notion that revolutionary politics
involves rescinding the liberal distinction between people and the state as an
external political form would suggest that the commitment to revolution is,
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precisely, not the kind of thing that can be ‘acquired’, and therefore the attempt
to understand it cannot begin by looking ethnographically at the ways in which,
per impossible, it is. Rather than sociological, then, the ﬁrst question must be
ontological: what kind of thing is a revolution, what entities and relations
does it bring into play and therefore what form might people’s commitment
to (or rejection of) it take? Rather than launching into an ethnographic investi-
gation into the ways in which people in Cuba engage with their Revolution, we
must inquire ﬁrst into the ways and senses in which the Revolution itself, as a
distinctive political form, dictates its own terms of engagement (cf. Althusser 1971;
Foucault 1982). In order to answer this question, the bulk of the discussion that
follows is devoted to exploring the ontological properties of revolution in Cuba
as these enunciate themselves in revolutionary discourse and action – in the
ways, then, in which the Revolution enunciates itself as a distinctive political
form (see also Holbraad & Pedersen 2012, 2013).
The Political Ontology of Revolution in Cuba
Cuba offers an optimal vantage point from which to rethink liberal political
ontology insofar as the question of how to think the relationship between
people and state is arguably what has made it so famous. Even at the most
superﬁcial level, one might observe that the extraordinary fascination that the
Cuban Revolution has held for generations of sympathisers across the globe
has much to do with its projection of an apparently impossible combination
of enduring revolutionary fervour with a perduring, against-the-odds statecraft:
the bearded images of hope, Fidel’s cigar-and-uniform, Che´’s youthful martyr-
dom captured for eternity on T-shirts and beer bottles. Indeed, if the Revolu-
tion’s vociferous US-based detractors and liberal critics have focused so much
energy on puncturing this myth, that only underscores the power of the
Cuban Revolution’s image as an enduringly ‘popular’ political experiment –
which is to say, a revolution belonging, not to a domineering state, but still
‘of and for the people’. While it is not my concern here to pass judgement on
either side of this cultural and political tussle of imageries, the fact that the Revo-
lution’s stance to the conundrum of the state’s relationship to the people has
been its abiding focus is my empirical point of departure.
While the vast political scientiﬁc and historical literature on the Cuban Revo-
lution of course sprawls to include a variety of perspectives and critical stances,
it is remarkable that, not only some of its key points of contention and debate,
but also the overall historical narrative in which they are embedded, are
moulded on the question of the state’s relationship with the people, and the
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shifting stances that Cuban revolutionary history exempliﬁes with reference to
it. This narrative’s abiding attractor, so to speak, has been the particular concep-
tualisation of the relationship between people and state that the Cuban revolu-
tion has in different periods sought to represent as an alternative, not only to the
political order it replaced in 1959 (or to the USA, ‘capitalism’ and the ‘liberal
West’ more generally), but also to that of previous revolutionary movements,
and not least the model of so-called existing socialism exempliﬁed by the
USSR. Typiﬁed in the ﬁgure of (Ernesto) ‘Che´’ Guevara both as its quasi-
mythical instigator and as its most articulate theorist (alongside Fidel Castro
himself), this vision of revolution purports to offer a radical solution to the afore-
mentioned conundrum. In line with earlier Marxist-inspired revolutions, such as
the Russian one, the task of revolution is posited, precisely, as that of obviating
the very distinction between state and people, such that the two become onto-
logically coterminous as the state ‘withers away’ and ‘communism’ is achieved.
What makes the Cuban case in its extreme ‘Guevarist’ guise distinctive, along-
side other socialist projects formulated as an explicit alternative to the USSR
such as Maoism, is that this goal is posited, not so much as a transcendent
outcome projected into the future (as, for example, in the Leninist vision of a
vanguard-led dictatorship of the proletariat leading at some unspeciﬁed future
to its own dissolution), but more as an immanent function of the process of
revolutionary statecraft itself. According to this vision, the immediate gauge
for the revolutionary state’s legitimacy is the degree to which it promotes a col-
lapse of the distinction between state and people, in a spirit of constant and
abiding political experimentation.
The locus classicus of this image of revolution is Che´ Guevara’s 1965 text
Socialism and Man in Cuba – in some ways Guevara’s equivalent, or even
answer, to Lenin’s State and Revolution (1992). Written from within the
Marxist theoretical tradition in which Guevara had steeped himself as a
member of the Cuban government in the early 1960s (Kapcia 2000: 121),
the text is presented explicitly as a refutation, based on ‘the facts as they
exist in Cuba’, of the ‘common argument from the mouths of capitalist
spokesmen [. . .] that socialism, or the period of building socialism into
which we have entered, is characterised by the abolition of the individual
for the sake of the state’ (Guevara & Castro 2009: 7). At the heart of his
case is a notion of the Cuban revolution as a project of ‘simultaneous creation
of socialism and communism’ (Bengelsdorf 1994: 91). The vision is pitched
explicitly in contrast to Marxist ‘scholasticism’, and particularly theories of
‘pure transition’, in which communism is supposed to result from objective
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conditions emanating from the class dynamics of late capitalism and, follow-
ing revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat (Guevara & Castro 2009,
16– 19).
On the contrary, argued Guevara, Cuba represented the possibility of speed-
ing up the transition to socialism by supplementing the objective conditions for
socialism – only partially met in the historical contingencies of revolutionary
Cuba – with an irreducibly subjective component: an ongoing and deliberate
effort to transform the subjectivity of the people by forging the so-called new
man, which is considered to be the existential outcome of all socialist revolu-
tions. Alongside creating the material conditions for freedom and prosperity
through new economic forms and technologies, then, an abiding objective of
revolutionary states and their institutions – in political mobilisations, labour
arrangements, education, the arts – is to bring about a new ‘consciousness’ (con-
ciencia) in the individual, as the subject of its history, in an open-ended project of
moral development, based on revolutionary values of voluntarism, selﬂessness
and public service (cf. Badiou 2009: 25)
A truly revolutionary politics, then, is one that is deliberately geared towards
an erosion of the very distinction between the state and the people and their
respective needs. The liberal charge of totalitarianism is ‘refuted’ inasmuch as
the Cuban state’s task is not to ‘abolish’ the individual, but rather to fashion it
into a new subjectivity or consciousness that not only embodies the revolution-
ary ethos, but enacts the very revolutionary condition that the socialist state is
charged with bringing about. At stake, then, is not a clash between two contrast-
ing ways of instituting and organising the relationship between a state and a
people (liberal, say, versus totalitarian), but rather two alternative ontological
positions on what might count as ‘state’ and ‘people’ in the ﬁrst place. Where
liberal assumptions premise the two sides of this political equation as (to a
degree) mutually independent variables – viz. sovereigns and subjects who
retain their respective scopes for autonomy, with different degrees of relativity
– Guevara seeks to articulate revolutionary politics in Cuba as a concerted
attempt to render them mutually dependent: a ‘society in formation’, as he
writes, ‘that will permit a complete identiﬁcation between the government and
the community in its entirety’ (Guevara & Castro 2009: 16, emphases added).
Guevara’s notion that revolutionary politics presupposes an immediate onto-
logical identiﬁcation between sovereign and subjects is most tellingly expressed
in his comments on Fidel Castro’s relationship with the people. Having extolled
Castro’s guerrillas as the ‘generator of revolutionary consciousness’ in the period
of armed combat that led to the ‘Triumph’ of 1959, Guevara is keen to dispel the
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misperception that, once in government, the forms of leadership and govern-
ment of this socialist revolutionary vanguard might conform to the image of
a ‘subordination of the individual by the state’ (Guevara & Castro 2009: 8, 10).
While ‘the state sometimes makes mistakes’, falling out of step with the
masses, ‘the difﬁcult thing to understand for someone not living through
the experience of revolution is [the] close dialectical unity [through which]
the mass, as an aggregate of individuals, interacts with its leaders’ (Guevara &
Castro 2009: 10– 11):
In this Fidel is a master. His own special way of fusing himself with the people can be
appreciated only by seeing him in action. At the great public mass meetings one can
observe something like the dialogue of two tuning forks whose vibrations interact,
producing new sounds. Fidel and the mass begin to vibrate together in a dialogue
of growing intensity until they reach the climax in an abrupt conclusion crowned
by our cry of struggle and victory. (Guevara & Castro 2009: 10)
Now, the common story told about the impact of Guevara’s radical vision upon
the course of the Cuban revolution is one of high idealism, borne, as the 1960s
unfolded, of a combination of revolutionary fervour and political and adminis-
trative inexperience, leading to a bumpy landing in the realities of state admin-
istration in the 1970s. Certainly, Guevara’s account of Fidel’s ‘fusion’ with the
people captures much of the effervescence of the early years of the Revolution
– what Jean Paul Sartre, impressed in his visit to Cuba in the early 1960s, called
‘direct democracy’ – with overwhelming support for the revolutionary leader-
ship (Bengelsdorf 1994: 66–98; Kapcia 2000: 99– 146, cf. Sartre 1961), massive
popular mobilisations in ‘revolutionary offensives’ such as the literacy campaign
of 1961, and, crucially, Guevara’s arguments winning the day in the so-called
great economic debate of the early 1960s, following which Castro adopted Gue-
vara’s view that the economy should be driven by moral rather than material
incentives (Kapcia 2000: 132–8).
Equally, for many, Guevara’s almost mystical faith in an ‘intuitive’ union of
state and people expresses an at best naı¨ve and worst crass disregard for due
democratic process, responsible for the increasingly ineffectual revolutionary
governance of the later 1960s, the failings that became apparent to all with
the emblematic ﬁasco of the 10,000 tonne harvest of sugarcane in 1970, which
Castro’s government had set up explicitly as proof of the capacities of Cuba’s
putative ‘new men’ in action (Mesa-Lago 1978). According to this common
view, Castro’s own admission of the failure in 1971, and the subsequent period
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of ‘revolutionary consolidation’ in the 1970s and early 1980s, during which the
revolution was substantially institutionalised adopting Soviet-style models of
bureaucratised governance, is proof positive of the unworkable idealism of Gue-
vara’s project of state–people fusion. In contrast to the Guevarist ‘vision’, the
‘reality’ of the advent of the Cuban Revolution, at least from the 1970s
onwards, is then seen as one of increasing concentration of power in the
hands of the revolutionary state – and not least those of Fidel Castro himself
– at the expense of the people whose will the state is meant ‘intuitively’ to
embody (e.g. see Bengelsdorf 1994).5
Such analyses certainly capture core aspects of the exercise of power and
government in Cuba and comparable state-revolutionary cases. At the same
time, however, the very suggestion that the revolutionary government in
Cuba has been blind to the need for democratic ‘mediation’ between the
people and the state, as Bengelsdorf puts it (1994: 6), arguably tells us something
important about the logic of revolutionary politics understood in its own terms.
If the Cuban leadership and its theoretical forefathers Marx, Lenin and Guevara
have been so consistently blind to such a need, as Bengelsdorf shows, that is also
because, in a crucial and irreducible sense, from its point of view such a need does
not exist. In fact, if analyses such as Bengelsdorf’s take for granted a version of
what we have called the liberal ontology of state versus people (such that
even a socialist revolutionary state must be built with an eye to an already
given distinction between the two), that is because they fail to take into
account the signiﬁcance the role of revolution itself, not just as an act that pre-
cipitates the project of socialist emancipation, but as a constitutive element of
that emancipation itself.6 In particular, to project the fusion of state and
people as a future or ideal goal for revolutionary politics is unduly to focus
on the content of state-revolutionary rhetoric – about the content of revolution-
ary politics as an ongoing project of transition, construction and so on – at the
expense of the key assumption on which this rhetoric is premised. Namely, that,
from the perspective of revolutionary form itself, the ontological fusion of state
and people which revolutionary politics is taken to enact is already achieved.
Seen in this light, I want to argue, what most basically distinguishes revolu-
tions from other kinds of political action is precisely the peculiarly formal char-
acter of their ontological stakes or, to put it the other way round, the peculiarly
ontological stakes of their form. In particular, whatever ideological content a
revolution might profess (and these can be as different as, for instance, the bour-
geoisie is to the proletariat), its minimum requirement is that subjects should be
prepared to sacriﬁce themselves for it. To revolt, simply, is to take up arms against
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the prevailing order, and thus to risk one’s self – indeed to risk one’s life. Akin to
war in this sense (Arendt 1990: 11–58; cf. Kwon 2013), revolution is the political
act whose price is potential death par excellence.7 Indeed, this would be a direct
corollary of the concept and the promise of a ‘New Man’ in socialist revolution-
ary discourse: that, insofar as the state-revolutionary vanguard and the socialist
cadre is ready to give up his entire former way of life including the manner in
which he as hitherto been a subject and person himself, he must also be
ready to die for the revolutionary cause (Cheng 2011). In a basic sense, then,
these two seemingly opposite existential revolutionary outcomes – becoming
a New Man, or dying for the revolution – come down to same thing: an essen-
tially ascetic, self-transformative readiness to sacriﬁce what one is in order for
the world – or at least society at large – to orchestrate itself in a new way.
The persistent emphasis on death as self-sacriﬁce, not only during the revo-
lutionary uprisings in Cuba from 1953 to 1959, when allegedly 20,000 lives were
lost, but also throughout the subsequent 50 years of revolutionary government,
has been well documented and discussed (see particularly Valde´s 1992; Pe´rez
2005: 321–82). Fidel Castro acknowledges the depth and resonance of this ulti-
mate commitment of revolution when, in History Will Absolve Me, he cites the
so-called Apostle of the ﬁrst Cuban revolution (i.e. the war of independence
against Spain in the nineteenth century), Jose´ Martı´, who was himself killed
in battle, and has ever since been commemorated as a martyr by successive gen-
erations of Cubans:
There is a limit to the mourning over the corpses of the dead, and that is the inﬁnite
Love for the homeland and for the glory that can be seen on her bodies, which has no
fear, nor is it abated or ever weakened; because the bodies of the martyrs are the most
beautiful altar to honour. [In verse:] . . .When there is death/ in the grateful arms of
the homeland/ Death is ended, the prison is broken:/ With dying, life, ﬁnally, begins!
(Jose´ Martı´, cited in Castro 1967: 53, my translation)
Certainly, such romantic invocations of the spectre of death as a means of
popular, and not least national, emancipation are common well beyond the
Cuban context, and this is consistent with the present argument about the
power of revolution in general as a political form founded on the ontological
effects of self-sacriﬁce. Indeed such an argument only reinforces the more
speciﬁc observation, elaborated in dazzling detail by Pe´rez (2005) in a book
about the particular salience of suicide in Cuban history more broadly, that a
commitment to self-sacriﬁce has been an abiding feature of the constitution
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of political subjectivities in revolutionary Cuba. As Pe´rez Jr shows in his close
account of how both the discourse and the practice of self-sacriﬁce came to
permeate all aspects Cuban society from 1959 all the way to the Special
Period, what is most striking about the Cuban case is the way in which
notions of self-sacriﬁcial violence are built into the very fabric of everyday
life, having been sustained consistently through the decades of the Revolution
as a common denominator of otherwise changing political circumstances.
To take just the most obvious example, the trajectory of the word ‘death’
itself in revolutionary sloganising is telling. In a way that has by now become
entirely ritualised – a matter, indeed, of revolutionary ‘form’ – all public speak-
ing in revolutionary Cuba is given the ﬁnal punctuation: Patria o muerte: vencer-
emos! (‘Homeland or death: we will win!’). And a further indication of the formal
weight of the word ‘death’ in this context is that at different periods of the revo-
lution this has been coupled with a variety of concepts, depending on the his-
torical and ideological circumstances. Before 1959, in the period of
‘revolutionary struggle’ (la lucha revolucionaria), ‘revolution or death’ and
‘liberty or death’ were the standard battle-calls. After 1959, with the revolution-
ary forces in power, ‘homeland or death’ becomes the most common. Then
from the 1960s onwards, as the Revolution is increasingly brought into line
with the Marxist–Leninist ideology under Soviet inﬂuence, there is a shift to
‘socialism or death’. And ﬁnally, as Gropas (2007) has argued, in the post-
Soviet era of the 1990s and 2000s there has been a marked return to the more
nationalist locution ‘Homeland or death’. Indeed, as Blum (2011) shows in her
remarkable ethnography of Cuban schooling in the Special Period, this prin-
ciple has from the early 1960s onward remained at the heart of the Guevaran
project to create the New Man, particularly through the education system.
Albeit formulaically, school-children in Cuba (the so-called pioneros) still greet
each day with what is, when it comes down to it, nothing short of a collective
(and heroic) death-wish. ¡Pioeneros por el comunismo, seremos como el Che´!, children
chant at each morning assembly: Pioneers for Communism, we will be like Che´!
(which is also to say, dead).
The distinctive political ontology on which this formal requirement for sub-
jects that are prepared to die is premised is set out with remarkable clarity by
Fidel Castro himself, in an infamous speech delivered to an assembly of
leading artists and intellectuals in 1961, where he attempts to allay fears that
the Revolution would stiﬂe their freedom of expression:
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The revolution [. . .] should act in such a way that these artists and intellectuals who
are not genuine revolutionaries can ﬁnd a space within the revolution where they can
work and create. Even though they are not revolutionary artists and writers, they
should have the opportunity and freedom to express their creative spirit within the
revolution. In other words: within the revolution everything; against the revolution,
nothing. Against the revolution, nothing, because the revolution also has its rights,
and the ﬁrst right of the revolution is the right to exist, and no one can oppose the
revolution’s right to exist. Inasmuch as the revolution embodies the interests of the
people, inasmuch as the revolution symbolizes the interests of the whole nation,
no one can justly claim a right to oppose it. [. . .] This is not some special law or guide-
line for artists and writers. It is a general principle for all citizens. It is a fundamental
principle of the revolution. Counterrevolutionaries [. . .] have no rights against the
revolution, because the revolution has one right: the right to exist, the right to
develop, and the right to be victorious. Who can cast doubt on that right, the right
of a people who have said: ‘Homeland or death!’ – that is, Revolution or death.
(Castro Ruz, from Garcı´a Luis 2008: 116–7, emphases added)
In essence, then, revolutionary ontology can be said to be founded on a syllo-
gism that, as it were, has death as its major premise. If to be revolutionary is
to be prepared to die for the revolution, and death is understood as the paradig-
matic and most complete form of self-sacriﬁce (see also Willerslev 2009), it
follows that revolutionary subjectivity takes an entirely encompassed form:
no part of the revolutionary subject, so to speak, remains beyond the revolution.
It is in this sense, then, that the mantra-like slogan ‘Revolution or death’, taken
seriously as a logical disjunction, implies the notion of revolution as a political
form that, strictly speaking and in line with Castro’s logic, has no outside – a
notion distilled discursively by Guevara himself when he proclaimed in 1965,
two years before his own iconically self-sacriﬁcial death, that ‘there is no life
outside the Revolution’ (Guevara, cited in Pe´rez 2005: 349). On such a view,
the act of armed revolution against the reining powers effectively takes the
role of a primordial act of political cosmogony, as it were. The people take
arms, not just to usurp state power, but, through the self-sacriﬁcial logic of revo-
lution, to render themselves ontological coterminous with it, thus giving birth,
effectively, to a new political universe.
Conclusion: Self-sacrifice and Self-equivocation
The idea that sacriﬁce might have ontological, even cosmogonic effects,
acting to transform the world at large as well as the people who perform it, is
something of an anthropological commonplace (de Heusch 1985). In fact, as
ethnos, vol. 79:3, 2014 (pp. 365–387)
Revolution or Death 379
the editors of this Special Issue suggest in their Introduction, the core idea that
otherwise divergent and often critical discussions of the idea of sacriﬁce in
anthropology leave in fact is that ‘something (or someone) new can be
created through the irreversible giving up of something else, most prominently,
a life’ (Mayblin & Course 2013). And the suggestion that the ontological stakes
of acts of sacriﬁce might also be political, such that the ‘something or someone’
they engender is a new political formation and its corollary form of political sub-
jectivity, is hardly new either. Such ideas have of course been articulated at
length by political theorists from Plato to Foucault – indeed, understood as
an ascetic stance of self-discipline, the notion of self-sacriﬁce can be seen as
the core theme that cuts across Foucault’s oeuvre in particular, from his early
analyses of the subject-effects of technologies of domination (Foucault 1977)
to his later concern with technologies of the self (Foucault 1998). More strictly
within social anthropology, Bloch (1991) has inﬂuentially argued that self-sacri-
ﬁcial violence, whether literal or symbolic, is a key feature of the reproduction of
political orders, inasmuch as it allows transcendent political forms to be asserted
at the expense of the ever-transient lives of the individuals that may man them at
any given time.8
As indicated in my introduction, this article seeks to add to such lines of
argument a consideration of the ways in which the ontological properties of
political forms (in this case of revolutionary politics, premised on self-sacriﬁce)
condition the ways and senses in which people may adopt them – the ‘terms of
engagement’ of political life. With reference to the Cuban Revolution, I have
argued that the premise of self-sacriﬁce (and indeed that of terror and violence
towards counter-revolutionaries) allows revolutionary politics to enunciate a
radical reversal of the very premise of what ‘politics’ is from a liberal point of
view, i.e. a reversal of the idea that people exist independently of the political
forms to which they are subject. Revolution is the move of saying that political
forms gain priority over the subjects that instantiate them. To go beyond revo-
lution is to die or not even to be human – indeed, to be de-ontologised or at
least de-humanised, as the pervasive designation of counter-revolutionaries as
‘worms’ so chillingly shows. In this sense, strictly and ontologically speaking,
a revolution is not the kind of thing that can be ‘opposed’, ‘questioned’ or
‘replaced’, since formally it admits of no ‘outside’ position from which such a
stance could be taken.
This total quality of revolutionary politics, I suggest, effectively serves to dis-
solve what I started off by calling the ‘late revolutionary paradox’ – a nation
complaining about the state of its Revolution while at the same time pledging
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viscerally its allegiance to it. From a meta-liberal point of view, the position is
indeed contradictory: either the professed revolutionary fervour is not as heart-
felt as it seems, or the daily litanies of complaint are merely superﬁcial (or, at any
rate, Cuban people who exemplify this contradiction are internally divided to
the point of schizophrenia). By contrast, taking the total form of revolutionary
politics seriously presents us with a different image altogether. In particular,
Cuban people’s increasing disaffection with the Revolution in this context
can be parsed, ontologically speaking, in one of the two ways.
On the one hand people’s opposition can be understood as being expressed
from a position within the political universe of the revolution, such that to cri-
ticise the revolution effectively becomes a revolutionary act in itself. In fact, this
has been a prime way in which the government has sought not just to accom-
modate, but in many instances actively to encourage, and even itself adopt, criti-
cal positions with regard to the revolutionary project: by allowing logical space
for them to feature as self-criticisms, and in that sense to be understood also as
yet another expression of self-sacriﬁce. Fidel’s emphasis on artists’ and intellec-
tuals’ freedom of expression within the revolution in his famous 1961 speech
cited above can be understood as a deliberate delineation of such a space (see
also Castro Ruz 1977). Certainly, artists and intellectuals have made full use of
this kind of opening to ‘internal’ criticism as a constitutively revolutionary
stance – most famously in the ﬁlms of Thomas Gutierrez Alea from the
1960s onwards (Chanan 1985) and more recently in Leonardo Padura’s marvel-
lously ethnographic detective novels (Padura Fuentes 2001).
The notion that criticism is inherent to revolutionary commitment, however,
has a wider purchase in Cuban society, as illustrated by my opening account of
the fracas between Jorge Louis, the drunken academic, and his indignant (even-
tually machete-wielding) host Rogelio. While Rogelio may have found Jose
Luis’s disrespectful comments against Fidel Castro politically appalling to the
point of counter-revolutionary, the latter, even in his drunken state, tellingly
framed his tirade within an expression of respect towards the Revolution’s
two archetypal martyrs, Che´ and Camilo. While disparaging the current state
of the revolution, he made a point of conceding, by way of his deference to
the martyrs, that its original ideals are to be upheld. Whether sober or drunk,
in fact, Jose Luis would often (and, in my estimation, sincerely) profess to be
‘a revolutionary’, much as Rogelio had done on that difﬁcult evening.
On the other hand, revolutionary totality notwithstanding, people’s exasper-
ated criticisms of the revolution could indeed be conceived as being offered
from beyond its conﬁnes. Liberal indignation with the ‘totalitarianism’ of
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revolutionary ‘regimes’ (i.e. the kind of BBC-take with which I started off) is
itself proof positive that this is perfectly possible, practically as well as logically.
But the kind of revolutionary dejection Cubans themselves have been experien-
cing with the gradual but seemingly ineluctable erosion of their model of social-
ism during the Special Period of the 1990s and 2000s may also lend itself to this
interpretation. Certainly, it would be difﬁcult to maintain that Cubans today live
in a closed world (if, in fact, ever they did). The opening to Western tourism in
the 1990s, massive migration to the USA, Europe and Latin America, Raul
Castro’s on-going liberalising economic reforms, and the nigh uncontrolled
inﬂux of Western (‘capitalist’) images and sounds through the media are all
obvious grounds for doubting whether the ‘no-outside’ logic of revolutionary dis-
course has had much real purchase on Cuban society in recent years. Indeed, lis-
tening to people’s daily expressions of disaffection in Cuba today, one gets the
sense of a people conscious of the tragic contingency of their Revolution and
well aware of a whole universe lying beyond it – alas beyond the national
shores, ‘over there’ (alla´), as Cubans say. Certainly, such an impression is born
out over and again in ethnographies of contemporary Cuban society (e.g. see
Berg 2004; Holbraad 2004; Hearn 2008; Routon 2010; Blum 2011; Pertierra 2011).
The point is, however, that as far as revolutionary discourse itself is con-
cerned this kind of liberal relativisation of the Revolution – comparing it to
an outside and ﬁnding it wanting – is fundamentally incoherent, as we have
seen. To think of the Revolution in this way is simply to misunderstand what
kind of thing a revolution is to itself. We have, then, a case of what Viveiros
de Castro calls ‘homonymy’ (2004: 7): people using the word (or thinking)
‘revolution’ to refer to (or imagine) something other than what revolutionary
discourse itself designates as such. Same word, different concepts. Interestingly,
however, while Viveiros de Castro develops the notion of homonymy in order
to parse problems of cross-cultural translation (e.g. what counts as an animal for
an Amazonian hunter and for an Amazonianist anthropologist may be two
different things), the terrain of homonymy here is not just intra-cultural (e.g.
Cuban government versus Cuban people), but even intra-personal, as my
opening ethnographic examples illustrated. Certainly, the idea of homonymy
allows us to conceptualise the otherwise blatant ethnographic observation
that people can hold at the same time views that are so divergent as to verge
on self-contradiction, which is vividly illustrated by Cubans’ complex attitudes
to their Revolution. But rather than accept the charge of self-contradiction and
then seek to explain it away with reference to the external (historical, social,
economic, etc.) circumstances that may account for it, the idea of homonymy
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dissolves the contradiction altogether. In at once detesting and pledging alle-
giance to their Revolution, according to this analysis, Cubans are not so
much speaking against themselves as speaking past themselves: revolution
qua object of discontent and revolution qua cause of self-sacriﬁce are just two
different things. To think that they contradict each other is to misunderstand
what is at stake in either case. Such a misunderstanding, as we have seen, can
play itself out as much within people in Cuba as between them and the meta-
liberal commentators who ﬁnd them so contradictory.
However, what perhaps most recommends the dissolution of the late revo-
lutionary paradox as an instance of self-equivocation (to recall Viveiros de
Castro’s evocative term for the constitutive misunderstandings that ontological
divergences generate) is the way it makes sense of the most striking aspect of
revolutionary fervour in Cuba, namely the sheer fact that is still there, after all
these years of national dejection and complaint. As we have seen, this is
partly a matter of the revolution’s constitutive immunity to (outside) opposition
– this being the crux of the ontological argument from self-equivocation: the
object of everyday discontent is by deﬁnition something other than what the
revolution takes itself to be, so criticism and dejection, however incessant and
growing, leaves the revolution proper (i.e. the revolution that demands the
people’s loyalty) strictly speaking untouched.
This ontological argument for the revolution’s immunity to opposition is
considerably fortiﬁed, however, by an important asymmetry between the con-
cepts of revolution enunciated on either side of our apparent paradox. Qua
object of opposition, the revolution is enunciated above all in discourse:
lament, complaint, indignation, sense of crisis, and so on. By contrast, as we
saw, revolution as an object of total devotion is constituted above all through
its own enaction, namely in the people’s commitment to self-sacriﬁce. It is
just for this reason that revolution posits itself as immune to all the bad
things people might have to say about it: revolution, at base, is a matter not
of words but of deeds. For as long as the commitment to the deed of self-sacri-
ﬁcial violence remains in place, according to this logic, discourses of critique and
complaint will continue to talk past their object.
To give a sense, not only of the shape that such self-equivocations take eth-
nographically, but also of the salient role that the commitment to violent self-
sacriﬁce plays in sustaining them, I close with the comments I was given on
the topic by a Cuban woman in her mid 30s, speaking in her home in
London, where she had been living for few years earlier as a migrant. The
words are poignant precisely because they are self-consciously offered from
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the ‘outside’. Yet in them something of the self-sacriﬁcial spirit of the Revolution
remains:
I was sitting by the window in the kitchen doing my nails and, something about the
light, it reminded me of when I was a kid, in the escuelas de campo [the mass mobiliz-
ation of school-children for voluntary agricultural work in the country-side which is
still a regular part of high school education in self-sacriﬁce (see Blum 2011)]. How hard
it was, how I didn’t like being there and the only point was to steal some tomatoes or
whatever for my mother, and how I still felt I had to stick it out for 30 days, otherwise
I’d be weak, and how now all that has lost its meaning. Stick it out for what – it’s all
gone to shit. [Q: you mean the revolution?]. Yes, the revolution, nothing’s left . . . I
don’t know, things have changed so much. Even Arsenio [her step-father], he used
never to permit any ‘wormery’ (gusaneria) inside the house. We always used to
tease him – any problem he had he used to write letters to the delegate, get up at
6am to go to the local government and complain about this or that. My mother
now won’t let him – ‘I’ll split your head open if you start with all that crap.’ He’s
understood that no-one lifts a ﬁnger anymore – it’s all the same to them, and it’s
hard for Arsenio who really believes in this. [. . .] He used to say that everything he
had he owed to the revolution, his job, the education, the healthcare. But now I’m
abroad and with the situation the way it is, he knows that this is all gone and that
without what I can help with they’d be in deep trouble. So he stays silent. But yes,
the Cuban is revolutionary (el cubano es revolucionario) , and it goes a long way
back, to the Mambises [the independence ﬁghters of the 19th century]. You know
how here [in Europe] if you’re a woman and some man starts messing with you in
the bus no-one does anything. The Cuban doesn’t understand that – he’ll ﬁght,
he’s a ﬁghter (luchador). Fighting is in our blood – the Cuban is a warrior. [Q: And
that makes him revolutionary]. Yes, that’s what’s left of the revolution – it’s like
my brother, you don’t mess with my brother, right?
This, then, is what revolutionary commitment looks like when stripped down
to its bare logical essentials: the bare life of violence, enough on its own to
subsume life – people’s lives, such as that of my interlocutor’s brother – to
the service of revolution as a total and totalising political universe.
Notes
1. All personal names and some identifying details are ﬁctitious.
2. Drawing on ethnographic ﬁeldwork in Cuba over the past 15 years, this article is
based also on research conducted during a Visiting Scholarship in 2009 at the
Centre for Advanced Security Theory (CAST) of the University of Copenhagen. I
am grateful to my colleagues at CAST, Mats Fridlund, Noel Parker, Karen Pedesrsen
and Lise Philipsen for their guidance in the political science literature, as well as to
Ole Wæver, the Centre’s Director, and Jytte Bertelsen, the Centre’s administrator,
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for hosting me. I am also grateful to Magnus Course and Maya Mayblin for inviting
me to participate in this project on sacriﬁce. Drafts of the article have been read by
Stephan Feuchtwang, Caroline Humphrey and Morten Pedersen – their comments
and suggestions have been invaluable.
3. This includes the whole period after Stalin, until the rapid demise of the socialist
ediﬁce at the end of Perestroika.
4. Appeals to ‘ﬂesh’, ‘blood’ and ‘ground’ connote an image in which social realities
invariably feature as ‘messier’ than the putatively idealised versions of politics pre-
sented by ethnographically deprived political scientists and theorists.
5. It should be noted, however, that Guevara’s ideas have remained a leitmotif through-
out the course of the Revolution, having been reafﬁrmed in the process of revolution-
ary ‘rectiﬁcation’ in which Castro engaged in the mid-1980s, to correct some of
the excesses of the bureaucratisation of the 1970s, as well as more recently, in
the 2000s, with initiatives directed at the ideological renewal of the revolution in
the face of the post-Soviet ‘moral crisis’ – see Kapcia (2005), cf. Holbraad (2011).
6. On the role of law and legal theory as a constitutive dimension of this process of
revolutionary transformation in Cuba, see Evenson (2003).
7. As the Russian conspirator Nechaev (an associate of Mikhail Bakunin and a self-pro-
claimed revolutionary) put it in the rather beautifully terse ﬁrst line of his Catechism of
the Revolutionary, ‘The revolutionary is a doomed man’ (2004[1869]: 71).
8. Note that, as a solution to the core Durkheimian problem of social reproduction,
Bloch’s argument on the sacriﬁcial structure of the reproduction of political forms
itself serves to reproduce the form of meta-liberalism: transient individuals are
posited as ontologically distinct from the transcendent political forms that outlive
them. The question of how to apportion the balance between individuals and
society in anthropological analysis is analogous to the question of how to strike a
balance between subjects and sovereigns in liberal political theory.
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